Poland’s Pivot, Korea’s Rise
A New Architecture in The Global Arms Trade
The global arms industry is accelerating. The last year has seen a 9.4% growth in international defense spending, led by Europe and closely followed by the Middle East and East Asia. This should come as no surprise. With armed conflicts erupting in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, alongside simmering tensions in the Asia Pacific, just about every nation is eager to buttress their national defense through arms imports or domestic arms manufacturing.
South Korea recently penned their largest arms deal ever with Poland, who has been on an arms and defense buying spree.
Yet tracking this trend in aggregate is challenging. Short-and-medium-term arms trade data is difficult to parse, and the aggregate arms transfer data shows only a marginal increase in the global arms trade. There are several reasons for this. In addition to the expected degree of secrecy surrounding national defense acquisitions, pricing is noisy – differences in purchasing power, maintenance/service costs, co-production deals, and tech transfer agreements, it is difficult to accurately quantify deals. Deliveries are also “lumpy,” in that they are often made in batches, along long timelines, so any given year might show huge transfers or none at all for a deal. A purchase agreement today might not mean the final unit is delivered for years or even decades in the future. Furthermore, SIPRI, the gold-standard for arms transfer datasets, does not track munitions, small arms, dual-use equipment, or smaller drones.
Even with all these challenges, one trend has emerged in the past several years: Small and medium-size nations are increasingly represented in international arms transfer data. So, rather than examining the data in full, let’s examine a recent case that exemplifies trends in the global arms market.
South Korea recently penned their largest arms deal ever with Poland, who has been on an arms and defense buying spree. Poland will receive K2 main battle tanks, K9 mechanized howitzers, K239 MLRS, and FA-50 light attack aircraft. The Korea-Poland deal acts as a harbinger of several critical trends in the global arms industry, offering an insight into an industry that belies straightforward quantitative analysis.
What Poland Needs
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted an immediate response from NATO, and Poland in particular, whose growing Western orientation and border with Russia motivate caution. Modernization plans predated the crisis, but the invasion accelerated them. The Polish military is caught between a Soviet legacy and the imperatives of modernization within a NATO arms ecosystem, fielding a mixed arsenal of aging Soviet-era equipment alongside more modern NATO platforms. This presents challenges to military planners, trainers, and logisticians, who must train on and service a dizzying array of combat and support equipment, from different manufacturers, using different munitions, and without interchangeable parts. But it’s not just about what Poland buys, it’s about what it makes. In addition to low-end products such as munitions, the defense industry needs to upgrade from making older generations such as PT-91 (a dated T-72 derivative), towards a more modern set of platforms.
These ambitious goals are not easy to achieve. Militaries generally balance platform capabilities (what it’s capable of doing) with the costs (acquisition, maintenance, and training) and the delivery (an F-35 in ten years cannot defend you today). Thus, Poland’s challenge requires replacing older equipment at a speed and cost that are commensurate to its budget, preferably with an eye towards modernizing their own defense industrial base.
American equipment is tested and designed for American mission sets – and the American military goes a lot of places and does a lot of things that small and middle powers would never dream of… American goods are expensive, demanding to maintain, and training-intensive.
During the late 20th century, Poland relied on Soviet/Russian platforms. They are affordable, reliable, and comes with few political strings attached. Furthermore, recent arms deals prove a willingness bordering on generosity when it comes to tech transfers. But relying on Russian exports would be bad policy, affordability notwithstanding. In addition to being Poland’s primary security concern, Russia has been losing market share in the arms trade. For decades, the breakup of the Soviet Union fractured its defense industry, and while it has maintained the smoldering embers of its military industrial complex, it has fallen far from its former heights. With its invasion of Ukraine approaching its fourth year, the Russian industrial base is in no position to produce for its international customers. Russian equipment’s poor performance in Ukraine, Syria, India, and Iran does not inspire confidence.
So Russia is out. The more obvious choice would be the United States. American arms rightfully have the reputation for being top shelf gear and largely fill Poland’s capability needs. Whereas Russia has seen its market share drop precipitously, the US continues to dominate the global arms trade, especially in precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and combat aircraft. However, while the United States remains the linchpin of NATO and the international arms industry, it suffers from several weaknesses that complicate Poland’s decision.
Depending on how you calculate, the F-16 costs about $27,000 per hour to fly. This is to say nothing about the $42,000 per flight hour for the F-35s slated to be delivered starting in 2026. Compare these numbers to the MiG-29, which costs only $12,000 per flight hour.
American equipment is tested and designed for American mission sets—and the American military goes a lot of places and does a lot of things that small and middle powers would never dream of. In some cases, governments work with American companies to design bespoke platforms for their specialized needs, such as Japan’s F-2, a supercharged F-16 designed to deal with Japan’s unique geography. But for most countries, this represents an expensive and politically risky proposition. Like any performance good, American goods are expensive, demanding to maintain, and training-intensive. For example, Poland flies American F-16s, a staple of global air power for nearly a half-century, and with a sticker cost of anywhere between $30-60 million, it’s one of the more affordable airframes available. The trouble is, F-16 training is long, and can last up to two years for some mission sets (a bottleneck Ukrainian pilots have encountered). Depending on how you calculate, the F-16 costs about $27,000 per hour to fly. This is to say nothing about the $42,000 per flight hour for the F-35s slated to be delivered starting in 2026. Compare these numbers to the MiG-29, which costs only $12,000 per flight hour.
American weapons also come with strings attached. Indeed, the US is notoriously prickly about who gets its weapons, and for any nation that may hold policies contrary to US interests may find themselves cut off from support. For many countries, relying on the fickleness of American politics is increasingly risky. The current president’s recent remarks about NATO do not inspire confidence on this front. While the US remains a primary producer and seller of arms, its production pipelines have not kept pace with demand. Poland’s planned F-35 fleet, for example, will not be in service for some time due to long production lead times. Indeed, Lockheed Martin (the primary contractor for the F-35) has a backlog of over $166 billion, a 5.2% increase year on year. Finally, the United States remains highly protectionist about its military technology, only selectively entering co-production agreements with other nations and restricting re-export of military equipment.
Enter: South Korea
South Korea’s modern defense industry traces its roots to the 1960s, when it began manufacturing munitions to support U.S. efforts in Vietnam. Since then, it has steadily climbed the value chain, producing small arms in the 1970s, trucks, ballistic missiles, and armored vehicles in the 1980s, and by the 1990s, venturing into combat aircraft. Today, South Korean firms offer a range of capable, export-ready platforms that compete on both price and performance.
South Korea is notably less protectionist than traditional arms exporters. It actively engages in co-production and technology transfer, giving buyers a stake in local manufacturing.
South Korea is an increasingly attractive arms supplier to the global middle class. Its depth of munitions stockpiles and surge capacity allow a ready inventory for export. Persistent threats during and after the Cold War demand high states of readiness on the peninsula, and South Korea has invested heavily in its national defense. Korea can draw down existing inventories to bridge orders while ramping up production of buyer-specific variants—effectively decreasing delivery times. In the case of Poland, initial deliveries of K2 main battle tanks and FA-50 aircraft were sourced directly from South Korean stockpiles. These stopgap units ensured rapid deployment, with follow-on deliveries transitioning to the K2PL and FA-50PL variants tailored for Polish requirements. This production agility contrasts with U.S. timelines, where lead times can stretch into the next decade.
Furthermore South Korea is notably less protectionist than traditional arms exporters. It actively engages in co-production and technology transfer, giving buyers a stake in local manufacturing. Poland’s modernization drive includes transitioning away from the Soviet-derived PT-91 tank, and the Korean deal is structured accordingly: Poland will co-design and eventually manufacture later batches of the K2PL domestically. This allows Poland to develop its industrial base while fulfilling urgent defense needs, and even export weapons it manufactures.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, South Korean arms are affordable. This point is especially salient regarding combat aircraft. Poland’s air force, currently juggling legacy Soviet aircraft (like the MiG-29 and Su-22) alongside American F-16s, faces enormous challenges in pilot training, maintenance, and standardization (see above). The FA-50, a light attack variant of the T-50 supersonic trainer, serves as a transitional platform. Originally co-developed by Korea and Lockheed Martin to train pilots for advanced fighters, the T-50 evolved into a highly maneuverable multirole aircraft. The FA-50 is inexpensive to acquire and maintain, costs a fraction of the F-16 to fly, and can absorb many of the peacetime missions that would otherwise age out high-performance jets. For countries pivoting from Soviet to NATO standards, it offers a training and operational bridge with lower political risk and faster delivery timelines.
Importantly, the FA-50 is not just a stepping stone to the F-16, it has become a regional export success, with sales to the Philippines, Thailand, Iraq, and Indonesia. In each case, it enables partner nations to train fighter pilots for eventual transition to more advanced jets, or to operate a capable but affordable light combat platform in its own right. In Poland’s case, the FA-50 fills a capability gap left by retiring Soviet-era aircraft and provides near-term readiness while awaiting deliveries of more advanced (and expensive) aircraft like the F-35.
This model of rapid delivery, industrial cooperation, and mission-appropriate capability extends across Korea’s broader defense products. K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers, K239 rocket artillery, and the FA-50 all embody a specific strategic posture—mid-sized powers in need of interoperable, affordable, and available platforms. In a moment when demand outpaces Western production pipelines while the global defense landscape is in flux, South Korea is stepping into a critical void.
The Rise of the Rest
But what does it mean for the rest of the world? The last several decades have seen remarkable growth in the global middle class. In addition to the emergence of China, states like India and Brazil have seen brisk economic growth. This growth in civilian market mirrors a commensurate growth in public sector purchases. Growing national budgets walk hand in glove with growing defense budgets, and the world’s emerging middle class has been increasing stockpiles and capabilities apace. Growing tensions between the US and China, the Israel-Iran War, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have reminded governments that the end of history is not nigh, and they ought to be prepared. This is especially true as aging Cold-War era platforms reach the end of their service lives. Despite nations best efforts, these platforms cannot last forever, and must be replaced by forward looking kit for the 21st century. Some nations, like Poland, choose to buy from abroad, with an eye towards developing their own domestic industry, while others—China, India, and Turkey—have already cut imports after increasing their domestic production.
The Korea–Poland arms deal illustrates what middle powers can now offer: faster deliveries, favorable tech transfer terms, co-production agreements, and platforms that are fit for purpose – good enough for national defense but not baroque systems for global expeditionary warfare.
For most nations, growing a domestic arms industry is an expensive proposition. Limited manufacturing runs may satisfy domestic demand, however, they also limit economies of scale and leave factories and workforces idle. The obvious answer is to turn to exports, thereby generating revenue for defense industries and keeping production lines open. Unfortunately, the technologies required for building high-end defense products is hard to come by. Nations jealously guard their national security secrets and are loathe to transfer these technologies. Sinking even more capital into R&D erects yet another barrier to entry into the defense industry. The result is that, beyond light armored vehicles and small arms, most nations would prefer to import.
The bipolar structure—The United States for top-shelf, NATO-interoperable weapons, and Russia for budget-friendly, low-conditionality alternatives—persisted for decades. That market has fractured. Russia, once a reliable exporter of inexpensive platforms, is now engulfed in war and facing sanctions, export controls, and reputational damage from underwhelming battlefield performance. Meanwhile, the United States finds itself struggling with production bottlenecks, protectionist export restrictions, long production lead times, and rising unit costs. That leaves a vacuum in the global arms market one increasingly filled by states like South Korea.
Just as the world’s consumer goods supply chains no longer flow solely from the West, neither will its weapons. The rise of the rest is not just economic, it is strategic.
The Bottom Line
The Korea–Poland arms deal illustrates what middle powers can now offer: faster deliveries, favorable tech transfer terms, co-production agreements, and platforms that are fit for purpose—good enough for national defense but not baroque systems for global expeditionary warfare. South Korea’s edge lies not merely in price or speed, but in aligning its industrial model with the ambitions of emerging defense customers. Unlike the U.S., which exports platforms built for global force projection, South Korea designs systems optimized for territorial defense and rapid deployment—doctrines far more relevant to midsize states with limited expeditionary requirements.
If the past era of arms trading was defined by industrial giants exporting to strategically dependent peripheries, the new era may see more peer-to-peer collaboration among middle powers. South Korea and Poland are both U.S. allies, both industrially capable, and both deeply concerned with defense autonomy. Their cooperation blurs the old producer-consumer lines. South Korea’s willingness to share production and customize platforms reflects an understanding that arms exports are no longer just about hardware, they are about industrial partnerships, and South Korea’s willingness to enter these partnerships gives it an advantage.
This may be the most enduring lesson of the Poland–Korea arms relationship. It models a new kind of defense trade architecture, one where middle powers co-develop and co-produce the systems they once purchased from superpowers. And it reflects a broader rebalancing of global industrial capacity and technical expertise. Just as the world’s consumer goods supply chains no longer flow solely from the West, neither will its weapons. The rise of the rest is not just economic, it is strategic.
States like Brazil, Turkey, and China are all increasing their defense output and exports. Others, such as India are producing domestically, but have not yet broken into the export market. So-called 4.5 generation fighter programs such as the the Kaan (Turkey), the AMCA (India), and KF-21 (Korea) signal not only a growth in the scale of capabilities, but their scope as well. Korea has moved fastest and furthest, backed by a mature industrial base, a constant readiness posture, and diplomatic relationships that allow for flexible arms sales to democratic and non-democratic buyers alike. If others follow suit, we may witness the emergence of a multipolar defense ecosystem less reliant on Washington and Moscow, and more reflective of the strategic concerns of the rest of the world.
Chart Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfer Database and Military Expenditure Database
Thomas Artaiz is a researcher, educator, and writer specializing in geopolitics, East Asian affairs, and the international arms trade. Thomas has held a variety of academic and research posts in South Korea, Japan, China, and Sweden, including as a research analyst, editor, and teacher. He currently lectures at Woosong University in South Korea, where he teaches courses in History, Security Studies, Political Science, and International Relations.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of any other organization or entity.
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